Consider a situation where one person, call him Sender, generates information in order to persuade another person, call her Receiver, to change her action. Sender and Receiver share a common prior about the state of the world. Sender can publicly generate any signal about the state and Receiver observes the signal realization before she takes her action. 1 Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) analyze a general version of this 'Bayesian persuasion' problem. 2 They draw on an insight from Aumann and Maschler (1995) to develop a geometric approach to Sender's optimization problem. They derive a value function over beliefs and then construct the optimal signal from the concavification of that value function. 3 This approach provides ample intuition about the structure of the optimal signal, but has limited applicability when the state space is large.
large but Sender's and Receiver's preferences take a simple form: the state ω is a random variable, Receiver's optimal action (taken from a finite set) depends only on E [ω], and Sender's preferences over Receiver's action are independent of the state.
This environment captures a number of economically relevant settings. For example, it might be the case that Sender is a firm, Receiver is a consumer, and ω is the match quality between the attributes of firm's product and the consumer's preferences. The interpretation of the signal in this case is the firm's choice of what information about the product to provide to the consumer. For example, a software company can decide on the features of the trial version of its product. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) also examine this specific environment, but do not characterize the optimal signal. They show that if one considers the value function over the posterior mean, the concavification of that value function pins down whether Sender can benefit from generating information but does not determine the optimal signal.
The problem is that it is difficult to characterize the set of feasible distributions of posterior means.
Any distribution of posterior beliefs whose expectation is the prior can be induced by some signal, but it is not possible to induce every distribution of posterior means whose expectation is the prior mean.
In this paper, we combine insights from Blackwell (1953) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) to derive the characterization of all feasible distributions of the posterior mean. 5 We then use this characterization to analyze the aforementioned class of Bayesian persuasion problems. Kolotilin (2014) and Kolotilin et al. (2015) examine closely related environments. They make the same assumptions on preferences but allow for Receiver to have private information. They focus exclusively on the case where Receiver takes a binary action. Kolotilin (2014) shows that neither Sender's nor Receiver's payoff is necessarily monotone in the precision of Receiver's private information. Kolotilin et al. (2015) consider "private persuasion" where Receiver reports his private type before Sender generates information. They show that Sender never strictly benefits by allowing for private persuasion. 6 While the focus of these papers is somewhat different, our proof draws on a result in Kolotilin (2014) .
I The model
The state of nature is a random variable ω on [0, 1]. Sender and Receiver share a common prior F 0 .
Throughout the paper we denote any distribution over real numbers by its cumulative distribution function (CDF); hence, under the prior Pr (ω ≤ x) = F 0 (x). Let m 0 denote the mean of F 0 . A signal π consists of a signal realization space S and a family of distributions {π ω } over S. Sender chooses a signal. Receiver observes the choice of the signal π and the signal realization s. Receiver then chooses an action from a finite set. Her optimal action depends on her expectation of the state, E [ω].
Without loss of generality we label the actions so that action a i is optimal if
Sender has some state-independent utility function over Receiver's action. If we consider an arbitrary signal π, what can we say about c π ? Since G π is a CDF and thus increasing, c π as its integral must be convex. Moreover, since any signal π is a garbling of π, we must have that G π is a mean-preserving spread of G π (Blackwell 1953) ; hence, c π ≥ c π by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . Similarly, since π is a garbling of π, G π is a mean-preserving spread of G π and thus c π ≥ c π . Putting these observations together, we obtain: Remark 1. Given any signal π, the induced function c π is convex. Moreover, c π ≥ c π ≥ c π .
II Signals as convex functions
Note that this result applies for any prior, not just for the uniform example depicted in Figure 1 .
In general, functions c π and c π are determined by the prior with c π flat to the left of m 0 and then increasing with a slope of 1, and c π equal to the integral of F 0 .
Finally, note that these arguments rely on the fact that we are interested in the distribution of the posterior mean rather than in the distribution of some other moment. If a distribution of posteriors τ is a mean-preserving spread of τ , then the distribution of the posterior mean under τ is a meanpreserving spread of the distribution of the posterior mean under τ . One cannot make the same claim about, say the distribution of the posterior variance. 7 7 Our results do apply to any setting where Receiver's action depends on E [ f (ω)] for some monotone f . Allowing for an f other than the identity function is equivalent to simply "rescaling" the units of ω.
III Convex functions as signals
Now suppose that we are given some function that satisfies the properties from Remark 1. Is it always the case that there is some signal that induces this function? The answer to this question turns out to be affirmative: Proof. Consider some function c satisfying the given properties. Define a function
, where c (x + ) denotes the right derivative of c at x. Since c is convex, its right derivative must exist.
Moreover, since c is convex and 0 ≤ c (x + ) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1) (cf: Lemma 1 in the Appendix),
G is weakly increasing and continuous. We also have that lim x→−∞ G (x) = 0 and lim x→∞ G (x) = 1. It is also easy to extend the analysis to situations with public, exogenous information. Let π e denote an exogenous signal that Sender and Receiver observe prior to Sender generating additional information. Sender then effectively chooses any convex function between c π e and c π . 
IV Optimal signals
In the previous section we transformed Sender's problem from choosing a signal to choosing a convex function. Our next step is to analyze how to determine Sender's payoff for a given function in this new budget set.
The key observation is that -under the preference structure we have assumed -Sender's payoff is entirely determined by the local behavior of the induced function at the action cutoffs, i.e., γ i 's.
Specifically, the left and/or the right derivatives (depending on how Receiver breaks her indifferences)
of c π at γ i 's determine how often Receiver takes each action. Hence, once we know these derivatives, we can back out Sender's payoff. We illustrate this idea in the next two subsections.
A Two actions
Consider the simplest case where Receiver takes one of two actions: a 0 or a 1 . To make the problem non-trivial, we assume that Sender prefers a 1 , but m 0 < γ 1 . 8 In any equilibrium, Receiver must break her indifference at γ 1 in Sender's favor. 9 Hence, Sender wants to design a signal that maximizes the probability of a signal realization s such that m s ≥ γ 1 . This problem can be solved algebraically (Ivanov 2015) , 10 but we nonetheless begin with this simplest example as it illustrates our approach in the most transparent way.
As mentioned above, the probability that Receiver takes Sender's preferred action is determined by a derivative of c π at γ 1 . More specifically, since Receiver breaks her indifference in Sender's favor, 8 Otherwise, a completely uninformative signal is clearly optimal. 9 Otherwise, Sender wants to induce a posterior mean "arbitrarily close" to γ 1 , which is not a well defined problem and thus cannot be a part of an equilibrium. 10 An optimal signal is a partition that reveals whether ω belongs to [x * , 1], with x * defined by´1 x * xdF 0 (x) = γ 1 . Receiver's behavior depends on the left derivative of c π . The left derivative at γ 1 equals the likelihood that the posterior mean is strictly below γ 1 -i.e., the probability that Receiver takes action a 0 -so Sender's payoff is decreasing in c π γ
Sender wants to induce a function that minimizes the left derivative at γ 1 . As we can see Figure 3 , he cannot bring this derivative all the way down to zero. Doing so would violate the restriction that c π must be both convex and bounded above by c π . In fact, looking at Figure 3 , it is easy to see that any optimal c π -the one that minimizes the left derivative -must satisfy two features. First, it must coincide with c π at γ 1 , as indicated by the "pivot point" labeled P. Second, the "arm" leaving P to the left should be "pivoted up" as much as possible, until it is tangent to c π . This identifies all optimal signals since the behavior of the function to the left of the tangency point is irrelevant. Any convex function within the shaded area of Figure 3 is optimal. These functions correspond to signals that yield a single, deterministic realization s when ω is above the tangency point and generate arbitrary (potentially stochastic) realizations (not equal to s) for other states. The top of the shaded area is induced by a signal that fully reveals all ω below the tangency point while the bottom of the area is induced by a signal that generates a single realization for all those states.
B More actions
Now suppose Receiver can take one of three actions and Sender's utility is 0 from a 0 , 1 from a 1 , and λ > 1 from a 2 . As before, we know that Receiver will break indifferences in Sender's favor and take action a 1 at γ 1 and action a 2 at γ 2 . Hence, Sender's payoff is determined by c π γ
Suppose m 0 ∈ (γ 1 , γ 2 ). Looking at Figure 4 , we first note that the optimal function must go through At one extreme, we have the blue function that maximizes the probability of a 2 . This occurs at the expense of a 1 never happening. At the other extreme is the red function that ensures that a 0 never happens, but consequently leads to a 2 being less frequent than it could be. Finally, the orange function shows a "compromise" solution where all three actions are taken with positive probability. As Figure   4 shows, we can index all potentially optimal functions with a single-dimensional parameter z that denotes the height at which the function crosses γ 1 .
How does Sender's payoff vary with z? Probability of a 2 is 1−c γ − 2 , which is linearly increasing in z. 11 The probability of a 1 , on the other hand, is decreasing in z. This relationship is generally not linear. As can be seen from Figure 4 , it depends on c π which in turn depends on F 0 . In the Appendix, we explicitly compute the relationship between z and the probability of a 1 in the case of a uniform prior. It takes the form of A − √ B − 2z −Cz where A, B, and C are constants that depend on γ 1 and γ 2 .
Because the relationship is not linear, we do not necessarily end up at a corner solution with either the blue line (zero probability of a 1 ) or the red line (zero probability of a 0 ) being optimal. 12 For example, if the prior is uniform, γ 1 = 1 3 , γ 2 = 2 3 , and λ = 3, the optimal z is 1 24 . This function cannot be induced through an interval partition. One signal that that achieves the optimum is a non-monotone partition that reveals whether the state is in 0, 11 Specifically, the probability of a 2 is 1 − γ 2 −m 0 −z γ 2 −γ 1 . 12 Of course if λ is particularly high or particularly low, a corner solution will be optimal.
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V Conclusion
Previous work on Bayesian persuasion built on the observation that a distribution of posterior beliefs is feasible, i.e., can be induced by a signal, if and only if its expectation is the prior. In this paper, we characterize the set of feasible distributions of posterior means. This provides us with a novel way to solve an important class of Bayesian persuasion problems.
VI Appendix
A Additional proofs Lemma 1. Fix any prior. Consider any convex function c :
Proof. Note that since c is convex, it must be continuous.
We first establish the result for the degenerate case where m 0 = 1. In that case, c π (x) = c π (x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], so we must have c (x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1] and hence c (x + ) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1). From here on, we assume m 0 < 1.
Suppose that c (x + * ) < 0 for some x * ∈ [0, 1). Since c is convex, its right derivative must be increasing so c (0 + ) < 0. Since c π ≥ c and c π (0) = 0, we have c (0) ≤ 0. Thus, since c (0 + ) < 0, for a small enough x, we have c (x) < 0. But this cannot be since for all x, c (x) ≥ c π (x) ≥ 0.
Suppose that c (x + * ) > 1 for some x * ∈ [0, 1). Since c is convex, we have that c (x + ) > 1 for all x > x * . Since c π ≥ c ≥ c π and c π (1) = c π (1) = 1 − m 0 , we have c (1) = c π (1). Since m 0 < 1, we have that lim x→1 c π (x + ) = 1. But then the fact that c (x + ) > 1 for all x > x * , combined with c (1) = c π (1), implies that there exists an x < 1 such that c (x) < c π (x) so we have reached a contradiction.
B Optimal signal with three actions
Suppose F 0 is uniform on [0, 1]. Consider a function f (x) = a + bx that is tangent to c π to the left of γ 1 and crosses through the point (γ 1 , z). Since F 0 is uniform, we know c π (x) = x. Hence, f must be tangent to c π at b and we have f (b) = c π (b), which means f (x) = − b 2 2 + bx. Since f (γ 1 ) = z, we have −b 2 2 + bγ 1 = z. By the quadratic equation, this implies b = γ 1 ± γ 2 1 − 2z. From Figure 4 we can clearly see that b is increasing in z, so we know that that the smaller solution is the correct one:
